DePaul Law Review
Volume 25
Issue 1 Fall 1975

Article 4

Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: A Brief Study of the Action of the
Illinois Judicial Conference in Recommending Revisions in
Supreme Court Rule 234
David F. Rolewick

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
David F. Rolewick, Voir Dire Examination of Jurors: A Brief Study of the Action of the Illinois Judicial
Conference in Recommending Revisions in Supreme Court Rule 234, 25 DePaul L. Rev. 50 (1975)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol25/iss1/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information,
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS: A BRIEF

STUDY OF THE ACTION OF THE ILLINOIS
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE IN RECOMMENDING
REVISIONS IN SUPREME COURT RULE 234
David F. Rolewick*
David F. Rolewick, former Secretariateto the Illinois Judicial
Conference, details in this Article the process by which the
Judicial Conference revised Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234.
The primary responsibility for the voir dire examination of jurors now rests with the trial court judge. Mr. Rolewick explains
this change in the Rule and the reasons which prompted the
revision, while raising some of the conflicts which may arise in
practice under the new Rule.
INTRODUCTION

On June 10, 1975, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted an
amended Rule 234 concerning the voir dire examination of
prospective jurors. This amended rule became effective July 1,
1975. Like its predecessor, the rule is to a great extent the product of the Illinois Judicial Conference and is designed to increase the role of the judge in the conduct of the examination of
prospective jurors.
RULE 234. VoiR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS (as amended, effective July 1, 1975)

The court shall conduct the voir dire examination of prospective jurors by putting to them questions it thinks appropriate
touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in the case on
trial. The court may permit the parties to submit additional
questions to it for further inquiry if it thinks they are appropriate, or may permit the parties to supplement the examination
by such direct inquiry as the court deems proper. Questions
* B.A., 1968 Loyola University (Chicago); J.D., 1971 Loyola University (Chicago);
Mr. Rolewick formerly served as Assistant Director of the Administrative Office of
Illinois Courts, Secretariate to the Illinois Judicial Conference. He is presently in private
practice with the firm of Roger K. O'Reilly.
The author wishes to thank Donna Rak of the DePaul University Law School for her
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shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instructions.'

In order to understand the new rule it is important to know the
processes which produced the version ultimately adopted by the
Illinois Supreme Court.' It is equally important to note the concerns of the committees that worked on the drafts of the present
rule and to explain the conflicts which will arise for those practicing under the new rule.
BACKGROUND

On January 18, 1974, the Executive Committee of the Illinois
Judicial Conference established a Study Committee on Jury
Selection and Utilization, giving the committee broad authority
to study problems concerning the use of juries and to report to the
Executive Committee with specific proposals in June of 1974.1
While the Study Committee felt that many areas of the administration of the jury system in Illinois required review, the report
concentrated on only one problem, the voir dire examination. The
report of the majority of the committee proposed two rule
changes. The most important proposed change related to Rule
234.
234. VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS
(Study Committee Proposal, not adopted)
The judge shall conduct the entire voir dire examination of
the jurors by putting to the jurors any questions which he thinks
necessary touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in the
cause on trial. The parties or their attorneys shall be permitted
RULE

1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 234 (1975).
2. During the November, 1973, term the Illinois Supreme Court approved a report
submitted to it by the Executive Committee of the Illinois Judicial Conference which
recommended a revision in the supreme court interpretation of Supreme Court Rule 41.
The report noted that the Illinois Constitution mandated that the Judicial Conference
meet annually to "consider the work of the courts and to suggest improvements in the
administration of justice: . . .'IL. CONST. art. VI, §17. That mandate required that the
predominantly educational role of the conference emphasized since 1963 be balanced with
a program designed to study problem areas in the administration of justice and to recommend to the supreme court possible solutions to those problems. The revision of Rule 234,
effective July 1, 1975, represents the first product of the efforts of the Illinois Judicial
Conference since its role was re-evaluated in 1973.
3. Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Judicial Conference, Regular
Monthly Meeting, January, 1974, on file in the Office of the Illinois Judicial Conference.
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to submit to the judge additional questions they wish propounded to the jurors. The judge shall propound to the jurors
such of the submitted questions as he thinks necessary. Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or
instructions.4

Second, the proposal suggested that Rule 233 be changed 5 so as
to specifically incorporate the procedure proposed in Rule 234. It
is also significant to note that the committee recommended no
change in Rule 4311 which specifies that criminal voir dire examination of jurors shall also "be conducted in accordance with Rule
234."

The Study Committee's concern with voir dire examination
was not new in the history of the Illinois Judicial Conference. In
1958 the Illinois Judicial Conference Committee on Limitation of
Voir Dire Examination found that voir dire was prolonged by
"tedious and repetitious examination," ingratiating rhetoric, and
tiresome outlines of the inquisitor's philosophy.' Therefore, the
committee proposed a rule which was designed to mandate the
dominance of the judge during the voir dire examination of the
jurors,9 to expedite the conduct of the trial and to eliminate questions posed by attorneys which improperly influence jurors."' The
4. Reading and Reference Material, 1974 Illinois Judicial Conference Report of the
Study Committee on Jury Selection and Utilization 1-2 [hereinafter cited as 1974 Report
of the Study Committee].
5. 1974 Report of Study Committee, supra note 4, at 1. The proposal was adopted. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110A, § 233 (1975).
6. 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 2.
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110A, § 431 (1973).
8. 1958 Annual Report of the Illinois Judicial Conference Executive Committee 92. This
language is quoted in the 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 3.
9. Tone, Voir Dire, New Supreme Court Rule 24-1: How It Works, 47 ILL. BAR J. 140,
145 (1958)[hereinafter cited as Tone].
10. Judges, throughout the State, faced with an ever expanding volume of litigation and in some sections scandalous delays, are increasingly concerned with
the disposition on the part of trial counsel to prolong inordinately the voir dire
examination by:
1. Indulging in tedious and repetitious examinations;
2. Propounding long rhetorical questions designed to ingratiate the lawyer with
the jury rather than to elicit information;
3. Making tiresome statements outlining the law, the inquisitor's philosophy
and ideas on various subjects, his notion concerning the thought processes to be
followed by the jurors, all thinly disguised as questions by the expedient of
punctuating the discussion from time to time with "isn't that right?", or similar
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1958 report led ultimately to the adoption of Rule 24-1"1 which
later, with minor changes, was renumbered 234. The rule stated:
234. VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS (superceded)
The judge shall initiate the voir dire examination of jurors by
identifying the parties and their respective counsel and briefly
outlining the nature of the case. The judge shall then put to the
jurors any questions which he thinks necessary, touching their
qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause on trial. The parties
or their attorneys shall be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
supplement such examination, but shall not directly or indirectly examine jurors concerning matters of law or instructions. 2
RULE

In spite of the drafters' intentions with regard to Rule 24-1 the
Study Committee on Jury Selection and Utilization found in 1974
that the abuses which the rule had been designed to abolish still
remained problems in the courts. The committee found that
"[t]edious, prolonged voir dire examinations still plague the circuit courts" and that "[a]ttorneys continue to pose questions
designed to engender sympathy, to instruct on matters of law or
to ingratiate jurors."' 3
The report of the Study Committee on Jury Selection and Utilization in 1974 explained that the committee sought foremost to
draft a rule which would provide for a selection of a fair and
impartial jury. 4 The committee also wanted the rule to reflect
their concern with the impact of voir dire on the administration
of justice, particularly with regard to the efficient utilization of
time 5 and the perception of the spectators and jurors. The report
explained, "For many of our citizens, the time spent serving as
jurors provides their only opportunity for observing our system of
justice in operation. In the words of Mr. Justice Black 'To perphrases more often than not without pause to allow the sometimes bewildered
juror to answer ...
1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 3, citing 1958 Annual Report of the
Illinois Judicial Conference 92.
11. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 24-1, 13 Ill.2d iv (1958).
12. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234, 43 Ill.2d (1970).
13. 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 5.

14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 7. For a full study of timesaving during voir dire see Levit, Nelson, Ball &
Chernick, Expediting Voir Dire: An Empirical Study, 44 5. CAL. L. REv. 916 (1971).

DEPAUL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 25:50

form its highest function in the best way, justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice.' "16
The Study Committee evaluated three methods of voir dire
examination: counsel conducted voir dire, court and counsel conducted voir dire, and court conducted voir dire. 7 The committee
found that counsel conducted voir dire is the least desirable
method" and that it does not necessarily tend to provide the best
jury. The Majority Report found the very reason for the lengthy
questioning by counsel is to select a jury favorable" to counsel's
client; impartiality is not the end result."5 The committee also
observed that this type of examination is the most protracted,
taking more time of jurors, counsel and court personnel. If the
trial judge does not participate in the examination, he may save
time. Only if he manages his call in such a way that he uses the
time productively, however, is the judge truly utilizing this
method of voir dire efficiently.20 Finally, the Majority Report observed that counsel conducted or dominated voir dire examination in many instances creates a detrimental impression in the
minds of jurors and spectators. The members of the committee
made this observation based on their personal experiences and
the experiences of many members of the state judiciary, as well
as on the contents of letters to judges from persons who had
served on juries or had observed voir dire examinations.2
The inevitable conclusion of the majority of the 1974 committee was that the trial court judge should conduct the voir dire
examination of prospective jurors. However, as the report emphasized, the conclusion need not be analyzed as the least undesirable of the alternatives. The committee found that there are many
positive reasons to favor a decision for court conducted voir dire,22
the chief consideration being that it is the most likely method of
selection to produce an impartial jury. 2 Questions are pro16. 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 7.
17. Id. at 7-12.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id. at 9; Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, supra note 15, at 936-37.
21. Minute Letters of the Illinois Judicial Conference Study Committee on Jury Selection and Utilization (1974-75), on file in the Office of the Illinois Judicial Conference
[hereinafter cited as Minute Letters of Study Committee].
22. 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 11.
23. Id. at 11-12.

1975]

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

pounded to the jurors by the only impartial person involved in the
case, the judge. He can best determine if the questions are improper or prejudicial. Relying on several studies the report further
reasoned that court conducted voir dire is the least time consuming method of jury selection. 4 This consideration is related to the
impression of the system on lay observers and prospective jurors.
The report stated that it was the majority belief that observers
and jurors found court conducted voir dire more judicious in appearance." The report also explained that under the proposed
rule attorneys would be allowed to present questions to the judge
on the record and have the propriety of the proffered question
preserved for review on appeal.2" Further, the report observed that
attorneys would have more freedom to observe the jurors. 7
The minutes of the committee's meetings indicate that after
months of study on the subject of voir dire examination there was
unanimity in the committee about the need for a revision which
increased the judicial participation in and control of the selection
of jurors.2" Three methods were forcefully proposed to implement
the change: 9 first, that the judge conduct the entire voir dire and
permit counsel to present him with written questions which the
judge can pose to supplement his examination; second, that the
judge pose all questions to prospective jurors but supplemental
questions presented by counsel need not be in writing; third, that
the court have the discretion to permit counsel to directly supplement the court's voir dire. When the discussions were completed,
the proposal requiring written questions to be submitted was
dropped. However, neither of the other two proposals could be
drafted to attract unanimity.'"
The title of the Minority Report 3 ' of the 1974 Illinois Judicial
Conference Study Committee on Jury Selection and Utilization
24. The Study Committee cited Levit, Nelson, Ball & Chernick, supra note 15, at 948,
where the authors reviewed a Los Angeles study, the New York experience and the federal
experience in court conducted voir dire. 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note
4, at 11.
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 12-13.
29. Id. at 6-7.
30. Minute Letters of the Study Committee, supra note 21.
31. 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 13-15.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:50

is a misnomer. The report reflected the opinion of one member
of a five-person committee, and it is to a great extent in agreement with many of the conclusions of the Majority Report. It
agreed that the broad judicial interpretation of Rule 24-1 :12 and its
successor Rule 234,' 3 coupled with abuse of the rule by many attorneys, required a revision of the rule.34
The Minority Report focuses on some points not fully developed by the majority but upon which most of the committee
members did seem to agree. The rule in use at the time35 was
drafted to require that the trial court dominate the voir dire examination of prospective jurors.3 6 Trial court interpretations had
emasculated the rule and had permitted the abuses to continue. 3
For this reason, both proposed rules of the Study Committee
stated, "the judge shall conduct," in an attempt to require the
trial judge to accept the responsibility given to him sixteen years
before in Rule 24-1.31 It is primarily in the degree of revision that
the Minority Report varies from the majority.
234. VoIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS
(Study Committee Minority Proposal, not adopted)
The judge shall conduct the voir dire examination of jurors by
putting to the jurors any questions which he thinks necessary
touching their qualification to serve as jurors in the cause on
trial. The parties or their attorneys shall be permitted by the
judge to supplement such examination either by direct inquiry
of the jurors or by submission of pertinent questions to the judge
for direct inquiry by him. Questions shall not directly or indirectly concern matters of law or instruction.39
RULE

The accompanying explanation indicated that this proposal
was drafted to permit the judge the discretion, after his thorough
examination of the jurors, to allow counsel to examine the jurors
directly or to require counsel to direct inquiry to the judge for his
32. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 24-1, 13 IlI.2d iv (1958).

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
court
38.
39.

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234, 42 Ill.2d (1970).
1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 15.
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234, 42 Ill.2d - (1970).
Tone, supra note 9, at 145-47.
The Minority Report makes this observation about the use of the rule in the trial
in its discussion. 1974 Report of the Study Committee, supra note 4, at 14-15.
Id. at 15.
Id.
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review.4 The minority explains that there is a need for some
inquiry by the parties or their counsel since they, not the judge,
are intimately familiar with the specific nature of the case to be
tried. They can better probe areas of possible prejudice which the
judge may not realize are involved in the case. Further, it notes,
if the court has the authority to cut off direct examination of
jurors by parties or counsel and if the court demonstrates a willingness to exercise this authority, counsel will not abuse the privilege of direct examination and a significant saving of time will
result.4
This two-part report was sent to the Executive Committee of
the Illinois Judicial Conference on June 14, 1974. At its June
meeting, the Executive Committee voted to have the report distributed to all the circuit, appellate and supreme court judges in
the state. At the same time, the Executive Committee agreed to
have the report discussed at the September, 1974, annual
meeting.4" A ballot was prepared offering the voting judges the
option of voting in favor of the then present rule, the rule proposed in the majority report or the rule proposed in the Minority
Report.
A letter43 dated December 20, 1974, was written by the Chairman of the Executive Committee and addressed to the Chief
Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court. It explained that at the
annual meeting of the Illinois Judicial Conference, the circuit
judges, appellate judges, and supreme court judges of Illinois
discussed and voted upon the desirability of changes in the Supreme Court Rule 234. The letter reported the results of the balloting. Ninety-eight judges voted in favor of the rule proposed in
the Minority Report, seventy-five judges voted in favor of the rule
proposed in the Majority Report, and ninety-one judges indicated
they were in favor of Rule 234 as it was in effect at that time.
In the letter the Executive Committee unanimously proposed
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Minutes of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Judicial Conference, Regular
Monthly Meeting, June, 1974, on file in the Office of the Illinois Judicial Conference.
43. Letter from the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Judicial Conference to the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, December 20, 1974, on file in
the Office of the Illinois Judicial Conference.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:50

a Rule 23411 for adoption by the Illinois Supreme Court, which
was a variation of the rule proposed in the Minority Report. The
proposal was followed by these comments:
This rule uses vocabulary of the present rule when it is possible. It does not require that the judge pose all questions to the
jurors but permits it, at the judge's discretion. It does require
that he conduct the voir dire and gives him the authority to
control the voir dire.
The second sentence of this rule, unlike the second rule proposed in the committee's report, uses the term "may" rather
than "shall" in reference to the judge's discretionary authority
to require questions be submitted to him. But it gives the judge
only two alternatives, thereby protecting the parties' right to
have on the record any questions they consider necessary. 5
In January of 1975 the supreme court forwarded to its Committee on Supreme Court Rules the reports of the Study Committee
on Jury Selection and Utilization along with the recommendation
of the Executive Committee. The Rules Committee had originally
indicated a preference for the Federal Rule 47.46 However, at a
meeting on April 25, 1975, the Rules Committee accepted the rule
proposed by the Executive Committee making some revisions in
the vocabulary before recommending the rule to the supreme
court. On June 10, 1975,11 the supreme court adopted the rule to
be effective July 1, 1975.
44. RULE 234. VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS

(Executive Committee proposal, not adopted)
The judge shall conduct the voir dire examination of jurors by putting to the
jurors any questions which he thinks necessary touching their qualifications to
serve as jurors in the cause on trial. The judge may permit the parties or their
attorneys to supplement such examination by direct inquiry of the jurors or may
require them to submit pertinent questions to him for direct inquiry by him if
he thinks the questions are necessary. Questions shall not directly or indirectly
concern matters of law or instructions.
Id. In writing their draft of Rule 234 the Executive Committee considered the report of
the Study Committee, the ballots returned by the Conference members and the memoranda of the professor-reporters concerning the discussions of the rule at the 1974
Conference. Id.
45. Id.
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 47.
47. Ill. Supp. Ct. Order Misc. Record No. 1713 (June 10, 1975).

1975]

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
PRACTICE UNDER THE PRESENT RULE

In 1958 the committee instrumental in the drafting of the former rule on voir dire expected that the rule would change the
practice in examination of prospective jurors. It was explained
that the rule "requires him [the judge] to initiate the examination and conduct the most important part of it. . ." and "that
there would seem to be little doubt that sound judicial administration is served by making voir dire examination primarily the
function of the judge. . ...,1Soon after the adoption of Rule 241 a commentator explained that under the rule the court should
attempt to question prospective jurors on all matters upon which
it thinks the parties may reasonably require information."9
However, in its investigation the 1974 Study Committee on
Jury Selection and Utilization found that Illinois practice ran the
gamut of possibility, from examination conducted totally by
counsel for the parties to court conducted voir dire. Neither of
these extremes were contemplated nor should they have been
permitted under the former rule.'"
Under the present Rule 234, court conducted voir dire examination of jurors is obviously permissible. The second sentence of the
rule is drafted to give the judge two alternatives. He may allow
questions to be posed directly to the prospective jurors by the
parties or their attorneys or he may require that the attorneys
pose the questions to him for his decision as to their appropriateness prior to the time they are asked of the jurors. This sentence
protects the right of the parties to supplement the court's inquiry.
The court must permit the parties to have their questions on the
record. Thus, should an abuse of discretion occur, it is preserved
for review.
The supplementary questioning, however, should occur only
after the court fulfils its own responsibility, which is clearly set
out in the first sentence of the rule. To avoid any carry-over of
interpretation of the former rule the "shall initiate" is replaced
by the more forceful "shall conduct." It will be harder to justify
48. Tone, supra note 9, at 141.
49. Id. at 145.
50. Minute Letters of the Study Committee, supra note 21. See also People v. Carruthers, 18 IIl.App.3d 255, 309 N.E. 2d 659 (1st Dist. 1974).
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judicial inaction during voir dire examination under this terminology. The term was used in every draft rule proposed by the
various committees and represents language accepted by about
two-thirds of the judges of the state. It might be reasonable to
assume that approval of this phrase forecasts a trend toward
increased judicial dominance in the jury selection process. The
rule certainly provides authority for the judge so inclined, and
undoubtedly the rule was drafted to mandate such judicial dominance. It is hard to conceive of an interpretation of this rule, no
matter how strained, which would justify counsel dominated
selection of jurors.
The allusions in the report of the Study Committee on Jury
Selection and Utilization that the failure of Rule 24-1 is
attributable in part to the judiciary rather than to the practicing
bar alone may indicate an insight which will prompt some action.
If the new rule is to be implemented, it will be necessary for the
court to question the prospective jurors on possible grounds for
challenge for cause. Further, the court must be prepared to question the prospective jurors on matters which may be a basis for
peremptory challenge. The use of prepared information cards on
prospective jurors, recommended by the Judicial Conference in
1958, should assist court and counsel in decreasing the examination time.
The court's questioning of jurors should be reasonably thorough. Prepared form question sheets may provide a good checklist. Supplementary questioning can be submitted to the court in
writing, to the court orally or to the jurors directly at the discretion of the court. As under the former rule, the use of the terms
"additional questions," "further inquiry" and "supplement," do
not indicate that repetition is appropriate. Rather, this stage of
the inquiry is to allow parties or their attorneys an adequate
opportunity to pose questions on matters of which the judge may
not be aware due to his lack of familiarity with the particular
case.
The last sentence of the rule, like the last clause of the predecessor rule, is a prohibition against education of jurors by the
attorneys. The prior case law on the subject of examining jurors
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concerning matters of law should not be altered by this
language."
The new Rule 234 represents a refinement of some ambiguous
language in Rule 24-1. The ambiguity was self-inflicted by bench
and bar. The new rule indicates a step toward firmer control of
the trial by the judge. The reports on the rule show a sincere
concern on the part of the judiciary about the appearance of
justice, as well as a willingness to exercise adequate control of
procedures to assure the efficient selection of an impartial jury.
Only time will tell if this rule will fare better than its predecessor.
Some trial judges who have begun to exercise their authority
under the new rule have indicated that jury selection time is cut
by about one-half. Some members of the bar, while initially objecting to the court dominance or the court's decision to pose all
questions to jurors itself, have subsequently come to approve of
the method."
THE LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGE TO THE RULE

An immediate challenge to the rule came from the legislature
which passed an amendment to section 115 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which conflicts with the new rule. Previously, section 115-4(f) explained that "the jurors shall be examined. . .as
a panel of 4 commencing with the State."5 Under this language
it has been argued that section 115-4(f) provides for the right of
attorneys to directly examine prospective jurors. 4 The new
amendment draws the statute into even sharper conflict with
Supreme Court Rules, by adding the following language to the
statute:
Each opposing counsel has the right to conduct his own voir
dire examination of each prospective juror for the purpose of
51. Osborne v.Leonard, 99 Ill.App.2d 391, 240 N.E.2d 769 (4th Dist. 1968); Christian
v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 28 Ill.App.2d 57, 170 N.E.2d 183 (4th Dist. 1960). But see People v.
596, 167 N.E. 786 (1929).
Kestian, 335 Ill.
52. Telephone conversations between Hon. Richard Eagelton and Hon. Wayne C.
Townley, Jr. and the author, September, 1975.
53. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(f) (1973).
54. When this argument has been raised in court, however, circuit judges have held the
statute to be a usurpation of the supreme court's rulemaking authority.
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determining such juror's qualifications, bias and prejudice, or
freedom therefrom. 55

The supreme court has not altered Rule 43156 which makes Rule
234 applicable to criminal cases.57
While it has been suggested that the right to directly examine
prospective jurors is constitutional,58 the real issue presented in
this conflict is not a constitutional right to examine prospective
jurors directly, but rather the power to regulate court procedure.
Since this rule-making authority has been adequately articulated
elsewhere, 59 it will suffice here to note that the Illinois case law
indicates such legislation is an unconstitutional usurpation of
judicial authority.'" The debates of the 1970 Constitutional Convention offer little insight into the intent of the drafters of our
present constitution in regard to rule-making authority. However, in their Report on Recommendations on Article VI the
Committee on Judiciary specifically cited the relevant case law',
and commented that the recommended language of the article in
''no way affects existing constitutional status of the Legislative
and Judicial Departments in respect to the general subject of rule
making power in matters of practice and procedure." 6
55. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(f) (1975).
56. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, § 431 (1973).
57. Interestingly, the legislation was introduced without any knowledge on the part of
Representive Stearney, the sponsor, that the Judicial Conference was studying the matter.
Telephone conversations between the author and Representative Stearney during July,
1975.

58. See Gutman, Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire of Jurors: A ConstitutionalRight, 39
BROOKLYN L. REV. 290 (1972); Comment, Court Control over the Voir Dire Examination
of Prospective Jurors, 15 DEPAUL L. REV. 107 (1965); Cohn, The Illinois Judicial Depart-

ment-Changes Effected by Constitution of 1970, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 355.
59. Trumbull, JudicialResponsibilityfor Regulating Practiceand Procedurein Illinois,
47 Nw. UL. REV. 443 (1952); Note, People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones: A Restraining on
Legislative Revision of the Illinois Supreme Court Rules, 6 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PRO.
382 (1973).
60. People ex rel. Stamos v. Jones, 40 Ill. 2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495 (1968); People v.

Lobb, 17 Ill.2d 287, 161 N.E.2d 325 (1959); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., 421 Ill. 145, 105
N.E.2d 713 (1952).
61. Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, 6 RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS 825 (1972).
62. Id.
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63

CONCLUSION

The recent amendment to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 234 and
the deliberations leading to the amendment have several interesting aspects. They provide the Illinois Judicial Conference with
guidelines to continue its efforts to fulfill the duties placed upon
the conference by the state constitution. They represent an extended process of study and evaluation by the members of the
Illinois judiciary in an endeavor to improve the administration of
justice. Finally the new rule brings into focus a conflict between
the legislature and the judiciary concerning the rule-making
authority of the supreme court in matters of legal procedure.

